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KAP STUDY ON SARS AMONG HOSPITAL WORKERS IN 4 PUBLIC HOSPITALS IN STATE OF 
SELANGOR 
Hasni H*, Nor lzzah S*, Sit. Ezat W.P** 
ABSTRACT 
A self'-administered questionnaire were sent to 1 public hospitals (HTAR, Tg. Karang, Bunting, Kajangi in Selangor 
as a cross sectional study. They were subsequently distributed arnong hospital workers and ancillary stafls during 
the SARS outbreak in March 2003. The purpose of study was to nzeaswre knowledge, attitudes and practice (K4P) 
during the SARS outbreak. Response rate of 83.9% was achieved (118 out of 531). This U P  study approached 
according to 7 aspects i.e. general knowledge on SARS; perception on management of SARS otitbreak; perception 
on the risk of contracting SARS; readiness to work handling SARS patients, conlpensation seen? Jit to hospital 
workers, overall universal precazrtions practiced and training received prior outbreak. Hospital workers were 
divided to 2 categories; direct poss ib i l i~  of being involved with SARSpatients i.e. 47.4% (21 I out of148) and non- 
directly involved i.e. 52.9% (237 out of 448). Majority of hospital workers $+,ere found to be non-directly involved 
with rnanagement of SARS patients. Hospital workers directly involved with SA RS were found to have .significant 
better knowledge on SARS (t= 3.907; p<0.005), perceived better managetnent on SARS by Ministy of Health 
(MOH) (X 2 ~ 2 1 . 1 6 3 ;  p<O. 001) and perceived contracting the disease as higher (X 2=32.07; p<0.001). However, 
they had lower readiness to work handling SARS cases (X 2 ~ 2 . 2 5 ;  p=l.33), but it was not sign!fkant. Communir)i 
health nurses and ancillaty staffs have the lo~ ,es t  level of knowledge on S A X  Universul precautions methods 
practiced more sign!ficantly among directly involved hospital workers were checking for body ten~peratures 
(p=0.039), wearing musk dtlring exat~rining patients (p=O.OOIj), work according to policy and guidelines 
(p=0.023), wecrring Personal Protective Equipnients IPPE) such as gloves, golzlns and .shoes ~vhen erumining 
patients (p=0.025) but Jozind that there was supply lack of PPE (p<O.O05). hfajority of stuJjS directly involved 
dziring SARS outbreak chooses compensation through critical allowances payment, followed by insurance coverage 
for staffs. Training of hospital workers directly involved were not standardized und was lowest on cases 
rnanagement (87.6%) and decontamination rnethods (88.6%). Conclusion: Health related programs in connection 
to an outbreak will cause unrest a~nong the workers unless given prior training and input. Without doing so, many 
will perceive it to be a burden and negatively perceive this responsibility. This leads to poor knowledge pursue oj  
disease and unreadiness to serve the public. Universal precazrtions against disease and trainings Mvre not 
stundardized among staSjS and this is e.specially evident in the public health and ancilla~y workers. 
Keywords: health workers, high risk, contagious disease, transmitted?z~niversalprecuution. 
INTRODUCTJON 
The recurrence of severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in China during 2004 has 
highlighted the continuing threat to human health 
From infectious disease outbreaks. Transmitted 
from animals to human; zoonosis caused by a 
coronavirus, SARS first emerged among humans 
in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong 
during November 2002. By March 2003, SARS 
had spread to neighboring Hong Kong and from 
there to Toronto, Ontario, and many other areas 
in a matter of days (Naylor et al. 2004). 
The SARS outbreak took a major toll in 
both of the major metropolitan areas, with 
deaths, illness, upheaval, collapsing economies 
and trades and hardship on multiple levels. 
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Accordingly, thousands of public health 
and health care workers rose to the occasion and 
ultimately contained the outbreak in the areas of 
resources that were suboptimal (Marla 2004). 
Transmission among healthcare providers 
remains a threat and adds suffering to the already 
fragile healthcare system. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Dybas (2004), SARS, a viral 
respiratory illness, is transmitted by person-to- 
person contact. First reported in Asia in February 
2003, the illness spread over the next few months 
to more than two dozen countries in North 
America, South America, Europe, and Asia. 
During the SARS outbreak of 2003, a total of 
8098 people worldwide became sick. of these, 
774 died. In the United States, there were 192 
infected individuals, a11 of whom recovered. 
The SARS disease has brought death 
and suffering as well as a dramatic economic 
impact in countries hit by SARS. Despite the 
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ar lvanr~s  of t ~ r h n n l n g y  thc threat frnrn 
emerging infectious disease has grown in the 
past decade, and experts say that it will only get 
worse (Parry 2003). The lack of a reliable 
diagnostic test in the early stages of the disease 
and the similarity between symptoms of SARS 
and those of other respiratory diseases make it a 
difficult disease to identify. Even with a 
sophisticated surveillance system in place, the 
first case was difficult to detect (Parry, 2003) 
partly due to ignorance (Parry 2003, Wilson 
2004). 
The SARS outbreak highlighted poor 
coordination between hospitals and the public 
health system. Guidelines may give definition of 
what constitutes a SARS alert and 
reconlmendations on the public health 
management of suspected outbreak but 
implementation especially in developing 
countries was poor. Developed countries may 
already have in place a mechanism for dealing 
with a major infectious disease, but developing 
countries are in dire needs to prepare for a 
potential outbreak. 
What is SARS? 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is 
the term being used to describe the serious 
respiratory illness which has been reported in 
parts of east and south East Asia, Toronto. 
Canada, with isolated suspected cases in parts of 
Europe (Parry 2003). The main symptoms of 
SARS are high fever, dry cough. shortness of 
breath, or breathing difficulties. Changes in chest 
X-rays indicative of pneumonia also occur. 
The SARS-associated coronavirus is 
believed to be of zoonotic origin, and while its 
natural reservoir or reservoirs are unknown. 
several exotic species (for example, civet cats 
and raccoon dogs) sold for consumption in 
southern China has shown evidence of infection 
(Jernigan et al 2004, Wilson 2004). 
Risk of Transmission 
Changes in human demographics. 
human behavior, and international travel and 
commerce are additional key factors in emerging 
infections. Mass movement of people into and 
between urban areas has exposed more people to 
infections that were once found only in rural 
areas. Closer living and working environments in 
urban areas, such as apartment buildings, office 
complexes, and hospitals. can further facilitate 
faster disease spread (Wilson 2004). So 
Infections move quickly across borders, 
sometimes even before symptoms develop, as do 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria. 
China. Canada, and other countries that 
experienced SARS outbreaks lost almost all 
tourism- and transport-based revenue for weeks 
or months. Canada documented millions of 
dollars of lost revenue due to a quarantine that 
kept workers at home and severely reduced daily 
activities such as bus travel, theater going, and 
restaurant dining. Furthermore, the response to 
SARS isolated people in infected countries from 
the rest of the world, led to their being 
unwelcome when they tried to travel abroad. 
SARS also stressed the countries' health care 
system, and medical costs soared during the 
disease outbreak (The Economist, 2003). 
SARS AMONG HEALTH CARE 
PROVlDERS 
SARS had spread rapidly by air travel to three 
continents and appeared to be highly infectious 
to health-care workers and patients in health-care 
settings. SARS, a viral respiratory illness, is 
transmitted by person-to-person contact. One 
person can have an enormous impact, whether 
the i l l  physician whose travel from Guangdong 
province to Hong Kong resulted in a pandemic or 
the ill physician, Dr. Carlo Urbani. who alerted 
the world health community to the SARS 
epidemic but ultimately, died from the disease 
(Naylor et al2004). 
Screening was originally recommended 
only for patients with fever: later. after CDC 
recommended assessing patients for possible 
SARS on the basis of fever or respiratory 
symptoms, triage personnel were instructed to 
screen patients with either complaint. The 
screening form encouraged staff to telephone the 
local public health authority immediately for any 
patient with the triad of fever, respiratory 
findings. and SARS risks (Wilson 2004, Jernigan 
et al. 2004). As time pass by and no more 
emerging new cases, public health workers and 
clinicians grew complacent about surveillance 
and susceptibility testing. 
Another potential source of SARS 
corona virus exposure among hospital workers is 
laboratories that store specinlens containing the 
virus or that use live virus for diagnostic or 
research purposes. Since fall 2003, 6 persons 
have become infected with SARS corona virus in 
3 laboratories in Singapore. Taiwan, and China 
and 1 of these patients infected 7 additional 
persons through secondary chains of 
transmission. Laboratory-acquired infection 
proved to initiate a community outbreak (Naylor 
et al 2004). Last, it is also theoretically possible 
that long-term SARS corona virus shedding or 
recrudescence of SARS in recovered patients 
could initiate another outbreak. but evidence to 
support such events has not been reported 
(Jerniqan et al 2004). 
A missed diagnosis can have serious 
consequences, since the failure to adequately 
isolate even 1 patient with SARS can lead to 
extensive transmission. The development of 
effective tools for screening and triage of 
patients with SARS would allow efficient use of 
resources in the event of another SARS outbreak. 
In Toronto and Singapore, SARS was primarily a 
nosocomial illness largely restricted to health 
care workers, patients, and visitors exposed in 
affected hospitals (Jemigan et al 2004). To a 
lesser extent transmission may occur to other 
persons who had close contact with known or 
suspected patients with SARS in household 
settings. It was detrimentally helpful, where the 
goal is to hospitalize all patients with SARS for 
the purpose of infection control, a practice that 
could overwhelm the health care system. 
In Toronto, where community spread 
was more limited, the proportion of SARS cases 
among health care workers was even higher at 
43.3%. Straightforward protection measures 
against droplet and contact transmission proved 
reasonably effective, but the spread of the 
infection to health care workers added to the 
stress both areas faced in combating the outbreak 
(Jernigan et al 2004). Along with other 
jurisdictions, the areas fought an outbreak, 
initially; no satisfactory laboratory tests were 
available to confirm the diagnosis in suspected 
cases (Chwan-Chuen King et al 2004). Even 
after reverse transcriptase polymerase chain 
reaction methods were instituted, rapid 
confirmation was not possible during pre 
synlptomatic or early stage of infection. 
Furthermore, both areas also dealt with travel 
advisories from other jurisdictions that 
contributed to economic dislocation and public 
upset. 
The woman in the emergency ward of a 
Canadian hospital has no idea of her ultimate 
fate. Within a week, the woman had died a 
victim of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS). The nurse and doctor who took care of 
the woman, and a receptionist who handed the 
woman forms to fill out. will soon be in critical 
care. In Hong Kong, the outbreak spread first in 
the community, but eventually 22% of all 
persons affected were health care workers 
(Dybas, 2004). 
SARS spread to 11 (58 percent) of 
Toronto's acute care hospitals with severe 
physcological and physiological impact (Chan 
22004). Unrecognized SARS among inpatients 
with underlying illness caused resurgence, or a 
second phase, of the outbreak, which was finally 
controlled through active surveillance of 
hospitalized patients. The transmission of SARS 
in Toronto was limited primarily to hospitals and 
to households that had had contact with patients 
(Svoboda et al. 2004). For every case of  SARS, 
health authorities should expect to quarantine up 
to 100 contacts of the patients and to investigate 
8 possible cases. During an outbreak, active in- 
hospital surveillance for SARS-like illnesses and 
heightened infection-control measures are 
essential. 
The importance of  infectious control measures 
Infection-control measures were implemented by 
public health teams together with hospital staff. 
Hospitals were required to screen all patients, 
staff members, and visitors for risk factors for 
and symptoms of SARS, and workers were 
required to use gloves, gowns, eye protection, 
and N95 respirators for all contact with patients. 
Similar measures were instituted for outpatient 
sites. and clinics were established for the 
assessment of SARS. Close contacts (henceforth 
referred to as contacts) were people who cared 
for, lived with, or had face-to-face contact 
(within I m) with a person with SARS or direct 
contact with the respiratory secretions or bodily 
fluids of a person with SARS (Svoboda et al. 
2004). 
In hospitals in which SARS was 
transmitted to multiple staff members and 
patients, it was difficult to identify all possible 
exposures within the 10-day incubation period. 
Therefore, all persons in a hospital were 
considered contacts and quarantined for the 10 
days after their last day in the hospital. 5743 
health care workers were placed in work 
quarantine. "Work quarantine" was established to 
prevent a shortage of essential health care staff. 
Members of the hospital and paramedic staff 
under work quarantine were permitted to go to 
work, where they followed the infection-control 
precautions. When they were not at work, they 
were quarantined at home. Staff illness in 
Hospital A was first recognized on March 21, 
and the hospital was closed on March 25 (Naylor 
et al 2004). The transfer of inpatients with 
incubating or unrecognized SARS between 
institutions resulted in nosocomial transmission 
in additional sites; health care workers who were 
employed at more than one site also transmitted 
SARS. 
A surge of cases followed within a 
group of hospital staff members whose exposures 
were related to prolonged resuscitation and 
intubations in a patient who was critically i l l  with 
SARS. This resurgence led to the refinement of 
infection-control measures for high-risk, aerosol- 
generating procedures. SARS in Toronto was 
primarily a nosocornial illness, largely restricted 
to persons who were exposed in affected 
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hospitals and household contacts (Svoboda et al 
2004, Naylor et al 2004, Najme Ahmed et a1 
2005). Once SARS symptoms were recognized, 
the infection-control measures that were 
instituted worked well. However. within 
hospitals, severe restrictions due to SARS 
resulted in delays in treatments for cancer and 
surgeries, and the continuous, universal use of 
N95 respirators and other forms of personal 
protection was stressful for health care workers. 
From Svoboda et al (2004), the spread of SARS- 
CoV by means of respiratory droplets can be 
controlled with less restrictive measures (e.g., the 
use of surgical masks in quarantine). 
In Hong Kong, the outbreak spread first 
in the community, but eventually 22% of all 
persons affected were health care workers 
(Naylor et al 2004). In Toronto, where 
community spread was more limited, the 
proportion of SARS cases among health care 
workers was even higher at 43%. 
Straightforward protection measures against 
droplet and contact transmission proved 
reasonably effective, but the spread of the 
infection to health care workers added to the 
stress both areas faced in combating the 
outbreak. 
Institutional infection control was 
undercut by shortages in personnel and deficits 
in knowledge of fiontline caregivers (Marla 
2003). Neither jurisdiction had enough infection 
control practitioners and infectious . disease 
specialists. For example. 42% of Canadian 
hospitals fail to meet the current US standard of 
I infection control practitioner (generally nurses 
or laboratory technologists) per 250 active care 
beds; 80% cannot attain the new Canadian 
standard of I infection control practitioner per 
175 active care beds. In both Hong Kong and 
Toronto, failure of institutional syndromic 
surveillance allowed SARS cases to go 
undetected and contributed to secondary spread 
of the outbreak after an initial wave of SARS 
cases. Both reviews highlighted concerns about a 
widespread lack of knowledge of basic principles 
of infection control on the part of health care 
workers, presumably because few had ever faced 
a serious outbreak of infectious disease. This 
situation, along with deficiencies in provision of 
personal protective equipment in multiple sectors 
of both health care systems, contributed to 
complaints and grievances about occupational 
health and safety in health care settings in Hong 
Kong and Toronto. Physical institutional 
deficiencies were also evident. Hong Kong had 
poorly designed ventilation systems, lack of 
basic hand-washing and sanitary facilities, and a 
shortage of single rooms with independent 
bathrooms. This contributed to inefficient 
logistics that hampers full healthcare workers 
cnmpliance with universal precautions methods. 
In the Toronto area, only 3.8% of acute hospital 
beds were in single, negative pressure rooms. A 
number of hospitals lacked infection-control 
areas in their emergency departments. Risk 
communication to health care workers and with 
the general public was uneven, compounded by 
the lack of certainty about diagnosis, treatment, 
and epidemiology throughout the outbreaks 
(Weinstein 2004). 
STUDY DESIGN 
Objectives of this study were to describe and 
compare among SARS and non SARS workers: 
a. By demographical factors - Age, 
years in service, place of work, 
occupation. 
b. Knowledge of disease 
C. Attitude towards disease 
(Perception): How staffs perceive 
management of SARS outbreak, 
risk of contracting disease, 
willingness to work and 
compensation mechanisms deemed 
suitable. 
d. Overall universal precautions 
practiced by hospital workers 
directly involved with SARS. 
e. Overall training received by 
hospital workers directly involved 
with SARS. 
METHODOLOGY 
A cross sectional study was done from May till 
June 2003; where 4 public hospitals were 
purposely chosen i.e. Klang General Hospital 
(Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah or HTAR), 
Tanjung Karang Hospital, Banting Hospital and 
Kajang Hospital. Self administered 
questionnaires were given to all the staffs 
including ancillary staffs that were working 
during these 2 months period. 
In the questionnaire, staffs were asked 
the f i l l  their socio-demographic background. 
These included their respective hospital, age, 
place of work (A&E, Wards, Clinic), 
occupations including physicians, medical 
officers, medical assistants, hospital attendants. 
community nurses, trained staff nurses, Radicare 
workers (private outsourced workers that 
maintains cleanliness, laundry supplies and 
hazardous waste management), X-ray 
technologists or ambulance drivers. Hospitals 
workers were also divided to whether they were 
directly involved in examining or treating 
patients suspected of SARS or not directly 
involved with outbreak management of SARS. 
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These data provide the basis of further 
d ~ v i s ~ o n  to SARS workers (directly involved) 
and non SARS workers (not directly involved) 
obtained for comparison. Universal sampling 
was done for all the respondents. Inclusion 
criteria included all level of staffs that were 
working during the time of study and agreed for 
participation. 
20 questions on knowledge (yes and no 
answers) were assessed regarding: epidemiology 
of SARS, its causes, methods of transmission 
and the symptoms manifested. 
Attitudes were assessed regarding 4 
different aspects. They were, staffs owns 
perception towards management of disease 
outbreak by Ministry of Health, their perception 
to the risk of infection and staffs perception on 
willingness to work during the outbreak. 
Perception on compensation methods deemed 
favorable were also asked. 
Lastly, practice was assessed by 
evaluation of self universal precautions and 
family's protection techniques used during 
outbreak. 
Analysis of the data by SPSS version 
11.0 and missing data were excluded from 
analysis. Descriptive statistics will be given and 
statistical analyses used are student's t-test, chi 
square and Anova. 
BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
All 4 hospitals are hospitals from the public 
sector. They provide highly subsided services to 
the state of Selangor general populations. 2 
hospitals i.e. Klang General Hospital and Kajang 
Hospital are with specialist status, while Banting 
and Tanjung Karang Hospitals are peripheral 
hospitals without specialist status. 
Klang General Hospital serves as a 
tertiary referral hospital whereby it serves as 
Selangor's top public referral centre besides 
Kuala Lumpur Hospital. They were also among 
the hospitals that were certified to cater to such a 
outbreak where by prior training and logistics 
support were allocated to these hospitals 
especially the Accident and Emergency 
Department where 90% of suspected cases were 
seen. Kajang Hospital is also a hospital with 
specialty services and seen as a referral hospital. 
It caters for the Hulu Langat-Kajang population. 
Suspected cases with SARS, patients 
who were exposed to known SARS or suspected 
cases, the general public with cough, fever and 
people with history of travel to suspected areas, 
will also be seen at the A & E department for the 
necessary investigations and treatment. The 
media hype about SARS has somewhat raised 
awareness and the general public had become 
Inore sensitized to the disease. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive and statistical analysis 
Response rate of 83.9% was achieved (448 
respondents out of 534 questionnaires given out). 
Delineation by hospitals, respondents mainly 
came from the HTAR (61.7%), followed by 
Kajang Hospital (l?.;%), Tanjung Karang 
Hospital (16.1%) and Banting Hospital (9.8%). 
Table 1: Background by Hospitals and Involvement with SARS According To Hospital Workers. 
Hospitals SARS Non SARS Total 
1 HTAR Klang 126(59.7%) 150(63.6%) 6 1.7% 
Total 21 1 236 100% 
Greater number of staffs were found to years (SD 10.02) and mean years of length of 
be in the category of not directly involvement service was 12.2 years (SD 10.42). Mean age for 
with SARS (239 out of 448; 53.3%), compared non SARS workers are 35.8 years (SD 10.94) 
to workers who were directly involved with and mean years of length of service was 9.5 
SARS cases (209 out of 448; 46.7%). years (SD 6.6). Directly involved SARS workers 
Data on age was normally distributed. were found to be significantly older (t-2.22; 
Mean age for staffs directly involved was 36.7 
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p=0.027) but the length of s e r v i ~ e  of these compared with 1 1 .1% for non SARS. Female 
categories was not significant. staffs mostly see the non SARS cases i.e. 89% 
According to seeing either SARS or  non and only 41.2% deals with suspected SARS 
SARS suspected cases; male staffs predominate cases. 
seeing suspected SARS cases i.e. 58.8% 
Figure 1: Distribution of Health Workers According to Sex 
Figure 2: Percentages of Hospital Workers According to Occupation Breakdown. 
By Occupation of 0.9%, medical officers 8.1%. trained staff 
nurses 24.2%, medical assistants 27%, 
a) Directly Involved SARS Hospital Workers community health nurses 2.4%, hospital 
attendants 22.7%, transported by medical 
According to attendance by healthcare staffs, ambulance drivers 1 1.4%, Radicare workers 
suspected patients were seen or  attended by those 2.4% and X-ray technologists 0.9%. 
who are in SARS workers category (Figure 3). 
These includes medical specialists who make up 
3 1 
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b) Not directly Involved Hospital workers 
Not directly involved hospital workers consists 
of by medical specialist 0.4%, medical officers 
3.4%, trained staff nurses 7 1.6%, medical 
assistants 4.2%, community health nurses 9.7%, 
hospital attendants 8.5%, drivers 1.3% and 
Radicare staffs 0.8%. 
By working place 
Most of the suspected SARS cases were seen at 
the Accident and Emergency Department as the 
first stop of medical intervention (66.4%), some 
were admitted in the wards for tests and 
investigations (28.4%) and some seen at the 
medical specialist clinics for follow ups (5.2%). 
Knowledge 
Mean knowledge of all hospital staffs regarding 
SARS methods of spread and symptoms 
Table 2 : Distribution of Knowledge By Occupation 
Total knowledge 
h r 
Pegawai Perubatan 
Jururawat Terlatih 
Pembantu Perubatan I Jururawat Masyarakat I 
I Atendan Pemandu 
Radicare 
Juruxray 
Total 
manifestation-S was 14.40 & 2.50. Generally, 
distribution of knowledge among the staffs was 
normal. 
Mean knowledge was higher among 
SARS workers (14.95 * 2.54), than among the 
non SARS workers (14.04 * 2.32). There was 
significant difference between these two 
categories at F3.907 (p<0.005). These would be 
expected as the staffs involved with seeing and 
treating suspected SARS patients have to 
critically expertise themselves with the methods 
of spread and symptoms manifestations. 
Mean knowledge among occupations 
showed that medical officers present with the 
highest score on knowledge (28.39 * 2.87) and 
was statistically significant (F=3.102; p=0.002). 
Community health nurses (mean knowledge 
25.83* 3.27) and ancillary staffs (attendants, 
drivers and Radicare workers; range of 
knowledge 24.00 - 26.34) were among the least 
knowledgeable categories. 
Perception 
N 
3 
a Perception on management of 
outbreak by Ministry 
Std. Deviation 
,57735 
Healthcare staffs who are involved with the 
SARS outbreak, perceived management of the 
recent SARS outbreak by MOH as positively 
better than healthcare staffs who were not 
involved with the SARS. Staffs who were not 
involved with the outbreak, perceived less 
positively on how SARS outbreak was managed 
by the MOH. Differences on view on 
management by MOH was found to be different 
statistically (X 2=2 1.163; p<O.OO l)  (Table3). 
This is probably due to the fact the 
personnel's involved with the outbreak are 
higher ranking officers that are also involved in 
local management of their unit at hospital levels. 
Thus they are more willing to accept and 
condone orders directed by the higher hierarchy 
of the Ministry level. They also understand thus 
perceive better that these orders or guidelines set 
by the Ministry are for the benefit of the staffs 
and the overall good performance of their 
respective hospitals. 
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b) Perception on risk of transmission 
Questions on perception on risk of transmission 
were done on all categories of hospital workers 
either directly on not directly involved. 
Total healthcare staffs who were 
involved with the SARS outbreak were 206 out 
of 44 l : (46.7%). 159 out of 206 directly involved 
staffs (77.2%) perceived risk to contact the 
disease as high. This is not difficult to see; given 
the extreme conditions and close contact, directly 
involved hospital workers have with suspected 
cases seen at the A&E, wards or hospital 
compounds. 
235 respondents out of total 44 1 
(53.3%) were hospital workers not directly 
involved with SARS. 119 out of the 235 
respondents not directly involved (50.6%), also 
perceived themselves as high risk of transmission 
(Table 3). 
Test for association between category of 
workers and perceive risk of infection was 
significant (X 2=32.07; p<O.OO l). 
Healthcare staffs who were not involved with the 
outbreak, perceived themselves more willing to 
work (64.3%) than healthcare staffs who were 
involved with the outbreak (56.8%). 
Healthcare workers who were directly 
involved, put themselves at risk by treating and 
examining suspected cases during the times of 
outbreak. A meager amount of extra time 
allowances and on call compensation was not 
seen as a fit compensation mechanism to 
motivate them to work willingly. 
These results were seen as a reluctant 
ness of the healthcare staffs' part to continue 
working under extreme pressure and doubtful 
conditions serving the general public. Ancillary 
healthcare staffs that was more willing to work 
was paid for extra duty and as they were not in 
direct contact with susceptible cases, not directly 
involved healthcare staffs was more willing to 
work during these outbreak periods. However, no 
statistical significance was found between 
categories of staffs and willingness to work ((X 
2=2.25; pC0.133) (Table 3). 
c) Perception on willingness to work 
Table 3: Staffs Perception on Management of the Outbreak, Risk of Infection and Willingness to Work. 
Healthcare Staffs Perception 
Staffs On management Risk of infection Willingness to work 
Category Low High Low High Low High 
n ( 0 )  n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Directly 5 9 147 47 159 89 117 
involved (28.6) (7 1.4) (22.8) (43.2) (56.8) 
Not directly 1 19 116 116 119 84 151 
involved (50.6) (49.4) (49.4) (50.6) (35.7) (64.3) 
Total 178 263 163 278 173 268 
(40.4) (59.6) (37.0) (63.0) (39.2) (60.8) 
Statistical X 2=21.163 X 2=32.07 X 2=2.25 
Analysis *p<O.OO 1 *p=<O.OO 1 p=O. 133 
Significant at p<0.05 
Compensations Fit 
The healthcare staffs were assessed on whether 
they felt payment mechanisms were needed; and 
if needed the methods of payment or incentives 
mechanisms they seem as fit for the duty they've 
performed during the SARS outbreak. Responses 
for these questions were lukewarm when only 
279 out of 441 respondents (63.3 %) answered 
the issue. The low response rate was probably 
felt as a waste of time for the staffs to answer the 
question; as usually no proactive action by the 
higher level managers in the organization who 
will attend to these compensation and allowances 
issues promptly. 
4 methods of payment mechanisms 
were asked or perceived to be most favorable to 
the staffs; 4 of these methods included payment 
for critical service allowances (elaun khidmat 
kritikal), appreciation certificates (sijil 
penghargaan), awards of excellence (anugerah 
khidmat cemerlang) or insurance coverage 
(perlindungan insuran). 
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Practice 
Workers 
Non workers 
Figure 3: Compensations seen fit according to hospital workers perception. 
All respondents who were directly involved 
during the outbreak were assessed of their 
universal precaution practices during this 
outbreak. The response rate was 180 
responder~ts out of 209 hospital workers who 
were directly involved in the outbreak (86%). 
Itespondents were asked 10 questions 
regarding universal precautions practices utilized 
during arid post working hours. Likert scales 
answers were given from numbers 1, 2 and 3 (1 
for always, 2 for sometimes and 3 for never). 10 
precautions methods were asked if practiced 
routinely during the time of outbreak. 8 questions 
were direct questions, while two of the questions 
(number 6 and 9) were inverse questions. 
Practices found to be done signzj7cantly by all the 
staffs include: 
Checking for body temperatures 
(:p=0.039) 
'Wearing mask during examining 
patients (p=O.OO 15) 
'Work according to policy and 
guidelines (p=0.023) 
Wearing Personal protective 
~equipments (gloves, gowns, gloves, 
shoes) when examining or treating 
patients (p=0.025) 
Lack of supply of Personal protective 
equipments (p<0.005) 
Practices found not to be signficant were: 
Bringing family members to a doctor if 
they fall ill (p=0.63) 
Washing hands only after reviewing or 
treating patients (p=0.068) 
Bathing and changing to clean new 
clothes after examining patients (p= 
0.577) 
Taking supplements such as Vitamin C 
(p=0.325) 
Wearing PPE only when examining or 
treating patients (p= 0.190) 
These actually reflect adherence to 
universal precautions as control measure. 
Practices seen here to be significant, are routine 
developed universal precautions taken as safety 
measures against further spread of the SARS 
virus. Wearing PPE is seen as an important 
measure against disease infection and for control 
purposes. However a significantly majority of 
respondents gave the reason of lack of supply of 
PPE was a major cause of forgoing this simple 
universal precaution measure. Most of 
respondents comply with wearing PPE including 
mask during treating or examining patients seen 
during this outbreak and they follow set by the 
MOH. 
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Table 4: Staffs Directly lnvolved and Training Given During Outbreak 
Training prior involvement Yes N o Total 
Training on cases management 162 19 185 
87.6% 10.3% 100.0% 
Training on transmission of SARS and it's preventions methods 164 12 176 
93.2% 6.8% 100% 
Training on proper personal protective equipments (mask, glove, gowns) 159 7 166 
usage 95.8% 4.2% 100% 
Training on SARS screening, transport and protocol management in the 162 5 167 
wards 97.2% 3.0% 100% 
Training on utilities and utensils decontamination methods 148 19 167 
88.6% 11.4% 100% 
Training on Ministry's guidelines 156 10 166 
94.0% 6.0% 100% 
The last section was targeted towards hospital 
staffs directly involved during the SARS 
outbreak. In this section, 6 questions on training 
prior involvement with the patients' management 
in the clinics or wards were asked. Answers were 
in the form of yes (score= 1) or no (score=2). 
They were asked on; 
Training on cases management 
Training on transmission of SARS and 
preventions methods 
Training on proper personal protective 
equipments (mask, glove, gowns) usage 
Training on SARS screening, transport 
and protocol management in the wards 
Training on utilities and utensils 
decontamination methods 
Training on Ministry's guidelines. 
Response from hospital staffs directly 
involved during the outbreak was only 1851 239 
(77.4%). The rest of the directly involved group 
of staffs didn't complete the questionnaire. 
Training of hospital staffs in infection 
control, how transmission occurs and possibility 
of spread to the staffs or their families was a very 
real possibility (Alice et al. 2003). During 
outbreaks, hospital workers are at high risk for 
nosocomial infections. Many hospital staffs 
became infected before confirmation of cases 
and isolation of suspected cases with SARS. 
From the table above, we can see that 
most of the trainings were given to the hospital 
staffs involved during the outbreak. Training on 
suspected or confirmed cases management 
(87.6%), transmission of SARS and it's 
prevention methods (93.2%), training on proper 
personal protective equipments (mask, glove, 
gowns) usage (95.8%), training on SARS 
screening, transport and protocol management in 
the wards (97.2%), training on utilities and 
utensils decontamination methods (88.6%) and 
training on Ministry's guidelines (94.0%). From 
the training coverage seen, the proportions of 
hospital staffs directly involved and given prior 
training was not 100%. This shows that adequacy 
on training of staffs on importance of SARS 
managements was not standardized to all the 
staffs directly involved with the containment of 
this deadly highly contagious disease. Spread to 
hospital staffs and subsequently families/ 
community were relatively easy had all the 
suspected cases managed by these hospitals were 
actual cases of SARS. 
CONCLUSION 
These data showed lack of training to hospitals 
staffs that should be corrected and properly 
elucidated. Further complacency will cause 
further deteriorations in the control measures of 
infectious diseases in hospitals and its workers. 
Policies by top level management and proper 
training should be facilitated to hospitals staffs in 
hospitals to prevent secondary spread to 
communities (Hy A Dwosh et al2003, Weinstein 
2004). 
Training of hospital staffs in infection 
control, methods of transmission and possibility 
of spread to the staffs or their families was a very 
real possibility (Alice et al. 2003). During 
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outbreaks, hospital workers are at high risk for 
nosocomial infections. Many hospital staffs 
became infected before confirmation of cases 
and isolation of suspected cases with SARS (Hy 
A Dwosh et. al. 2003). The fact that community 
health personals are lacking in the knowledge of 
infectious diseases as it is felt as distant from 
them; further emphasizes the extreme need and 
urgency on proper maintenance and continuous 
improvement in training, knowledge, awareness 
with a state of vigilance. 
There are several limitations to this 
study. The analysis done was based on the 
assumptions that hospital staffs directly involved 
with suspected cases, do truly see cases with 
clinical symptoms or manifestations of SARS 
like, and thus truly are exposed. 
Meanwhile hospital staffs that were not 
directly involved did not see any suspected cases 
of SARS. But this fact perceived by the hospital 
staffs will actually influence their knowledge, 
perception and attitudes to their infection control 
measures practiced. The mere fact when the 
hospital staffs perceived that they were not 
involved with SARS cases or suspected cases 
actually, the adherence to infectious control 
measures and knowledge will deteriorate and 
reflect their less need to do so. This reflects the 
significance difference found on the level of 
SARS knowledge. This is against the fact that 
rigorous isolation, universal and barrier 
precautions are an effective means of controlling 
the spread of disease in the hospital setting 
(Alice et al. 2003, Hy A Dwosh et al. 2003). The 
sampling of the hospitals for the study was more 
of purposive sampling, by right it should have 
been a multistage with random sampling of 
different levels of ancillary and professional 
hospital workers. That would be more reflective 
of the KAP of hospital staffs of whole state of 
Selangor. 
As professionals, public health staffs 
and clinicians as hospitals staffs working for the 
general public health aspects, this increased risk 
must be met with an extensive ethics issue 
whether to continue serving the public and 
further possible exposure or remaining at the 
background or absenteeism from work (Landers 
2004). 
SARS has passed but it may recur. The 
ever changing faqade of old or new and deadly 
diseases like Creutzfeldt-Jakob; Escherichia coli; 
human immunodeficiency virus; V. cholerae, 
Tuberculosis, Japanese encephalitis. Avian-flu 
virus etc. will come and go. Without the effective 
use of infection control knowledge and practice 
control of out breaks in hospital setting will be a 
losing battle. 
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